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TIE MENTALLY IMPAIRED AND VOLUNTARILY INTOXICATED
CRIMINAL OFFENDER
United States v. Jewett, 438 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 947 (1971)
Jewett, an American Indian with an I.Q. of 70,1 had received ex-
tensive treatment for a traumatic brain injury. He was subject to epi-
lectic seizures which were controlled by medication, and he was de-
scribed as a periodic drinker2 with an explosive personality. He was
sane except during violent psychotic episodes triggered by drinking.
During these episodes he was unable to distinguish right from wrong,
but he ". . . possessed sufficient awareness, intelligence and mental
capacity when he was not drinking to be aware of the effect alcohol
. . . [had] . . . on him . . . and he had the ability to exercise a
choice as to whether or not to drink alcoholic beverages. . .. -3 After
spending three and one half years in a mental hospital between 1964
and 1969, he was discharged as sane. Six months after his discharge
he went to the home of a friend and, without provocation, ordered every-
one present to leave. In a psychotic state resulting from drinking,
he beat to death the one person who refused to leave.4  His conviction
for murder in the second degree5 was affirmed by the United States
1. Based on this I.Q., Jewett would be in a class designated as "borderline
mental retardation." See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS,
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 14 (2d ed. 1968).
2. A "periodic drinker" is not a chronic alcoholic by most authorities. See, e.g.,
F. GRAD, A. GOLDBERG, AND B. SHAPIRO, ALCOHOLISM AND THE LAW 39-46 (1971).
3. United States v. Jewett, 438 F.2d 495, 497 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
947 (1971).
4. Evidence that Jewett was intoxicated was based upon testimony by four arrest-
ing officers that "they smelled liquor on his breath; that defendant staggered; that he
was glassy eyed, and that his speech was slurred." Id. at 498.
The only psychiatrist to testify was the head of the South Dakota Mental Hospital
where Jewett had been hospitalized. He stated that Jewett was unable to distinguish
right from wrong at the time of the killing. However, it should be noted that expert
opinion as to insanity is not binding on the trier of fact. Dusky v. United States,
295 F.2d 743, 754 (8th Cir. 1961).
5. Jewett was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970), which reads:
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of will-
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Held: insanity induced by
voluntary intoxication is no defense to a crime requiring a general in-
tent if the defendant is aware of the effect that drinking has on him.0
The law does not treat an accused who is insane at the time he com-
mits the actus reus of a crime the same as it does one who is volun-
tarily intoxicated. An accused who is insane is acquitted on the ground
that his state of mind precludes the mens rea required for guilt.7  An
accused who is voluntarily intoxicated is not relieved of responsibility
for his conduct;" however, when the existence of a specific purpose or
ful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpe-
tration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, burglary, or robbery;
or perpetrated from premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect
the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the
first degree. Any other murder is murder in the second degree ...
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970), federal courts are given jurisdiction over certain
major crimes committed by Indians in Indian country.
Jewett also appealed the admission of certain evidence to establish the jurisdiction
of the federal court and argued that the Indian title to the land upon which the crime
was committed had been extinguished. The court held that admission of the realty
officer's testimony, which may have been secondary evidence, was within the discretion-
ary limits of the trial judge and was sufficient to establish Indian title to the land.
438 F.2d at 497.
6. 438 F.2d at 499.
The evidence was undisputed that the defendant had the ability to exercise a
choice whether to drink, but it is not clear whether this fact is essential to the holding.
Had the defendant been a "chronic alcoholic" and therefore unable to exercise a choice,
it is probable that the court would have reached the same result. The basis for the
same result would be the Supreme Court's rejection of the contention that chronic al-
coholism is a disease. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). For a collection of
authorities who view alcoholism as a disease, see Easter v. District of Columbia,
361 F.2d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Appendix A).
7. J. HALL, GENERAL. PIRNCIPLES oF CRiMINAL LAw 449 (2d ed. 1960). Several
legal tests exist to measure insanity, and the Eighth Circuit has approved all but the
Durham rule. Beardslee v. United States, 387 F.2d 280, 295 (8th Cir. 1967). In
Pope v. United States, the court formulated a test based upon three factors: The de-
fendant's cognition, volition, and capacity to control his behavior. 372 F.2d 710,
734-35 (8th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1967).
8. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 894 (2d ed. 1969). In Kane v. United States,
399 F.2d 730, 736 n.10 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1057 (1969), the
court stated:
We refer to this [the voluntary intoxication rule] as the general rule be-
cause it is the settled view of the common law and is articulated in the stat-
utes of some twenty states. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code,
Tentative Draft No. 9, May 8, 1959, Comments following Section 2.08. It is
also the rule by judicial decision in the federal courts.
This rule is based upon three considerations: drunkenness can be easily feigned; the
drunk is a threat to society; and many crimes are committed by persons under the
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intent is necessary for a crime or for a particular degree of a crime,
the "exculpatory rule" allows evidence of intoxication to be admitted
to vitiate the required special mental element.' A state of mind cre-
ated by voluntary intoxication is not a major mental disorder or dis-
ease which amounts to legal insanity, and "the courts . . . have taken
little or no notice of modem medical attitudes toward alcoholism as a
disease, but have usually assumed that the intoxication must be treated
as voluntary for purposes of determining criminal guilt, no matter how
compulsive the accused's addiction to alcohol may have been."'1  But
many alcoholics and addicts become insane as a result of their long-
term over-indulgence. Thus, when drunkenness or addiction merges
with insanity, the accused will not be convicted because "the law takes
no notice of the cause of insanity.""
The "diminished capacity rule" permits a defendant to introduce evi-
dence of an abnormal mental condition, not amounting to legal in-
influence of alcohol. Note, Volitional Fault and the Intoxicated Criminal Offender,
36 U. CIN. L. Rav. 258, 268 (1967). See also G. WILLiAMS, CmiALI. LAw 560
(2d ed. 1961); Note, Mental Disorders and Criminal Responsibility: The Recommenda-
tions of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 482 (1955).
[I]t is only where the alcohol is introduced into the accused's system by force
majeure that the intoxication would be regarded as involuntary for the pur-
poses of the application of these rules.
438 F.2d at 499, quoting Utsler v. State, 84 S.D. 360, 364, 171 N.W.2d 739, 741
(1969), citing 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1239 (1966).
9. Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 1967); see Comment,
Intoxication as a Criminal Defense, 55 CoLUm. L. REv. 1210 (1955). The exculpa-
tory rule is in effect in all federal courts. Tucker v. United States, 151 U.S. 164, 169
(1894); Hopt v. Utah, 104 U.S. 631, 634 (1894).
The usual effect of the rule in first-degree murder cases is to reduce the offense
to second degree murder, which only requires a general intent. A minority of courts,
however, have used the exculpatory rule as the basis for reducing first degree murder
to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. E.g., Ray v. State, 257 Ala.
418, 59 So. 2d 582 (1952); State v. Sprouse, 63 Idaho 166, 118 P.2d 378 (1941).
This was the effect of the rule at common law where there were no degrees of murder.
R. PERKINS, CRLMINAL LAw 70 (2d ed. 1969).
In Section 2.08 of the Model Penal Code, the formulators give recognition to the
exculpatory rule, but in the Comment to the section some writers support a minority
position on the basis that the distinction between specific and general intent is "ob-
scure and unanalyzed." The minority suggest that the intoxicated offender may be
incapable of entertaining the malice aforethought necessary in the general intent crime
of second degree murder. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959). See notes 12-14 infra and accompanying text.
10. 438 F.2d 499, citing Utsler v. State, 84 S.D. 360, 364, 171 N.W.2d 739,
741 (1969). See also Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1239 (1966).
11. R. PERKINS, CRuINAL LAw 906 (2d ed. 1969).
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sanity, in order to show that he did not have the special mental element
which is required for particular crimes.12 The distinction between this
rule and the exculpatory rule is that evidence other than that of intoxi-
cation may be introduced. The purpose of the diminished capacity
rule is to reduce the criminal responsibility of those persons who are
only partially capable of controlling their behavior.' 3  In a prosecution
for first degree murder, for example, evidence of diminished capacity,
whether caused by trauma, disease, or intoxication, would be admissible
to negate the specific intent element of the crime, i.e., premeditation
and deliberation. In some jurisdictions, where malice has been recog-
nized as the specific mental state for both degrees of murder, evidence
of diminished capacity has been admitted, as a logical extension of the
rule, to negate the malice requirement. 4
There are other situations in which the law has held an accused re-
sponsible for his criminal conduct although he did not have control of
12. People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
836 (1949); People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959). See cases
collected in Annot., 22 A.L.R. 3d 1228, 1246 (1968).
13. A. GOLDSTEiN, THE INsANrrY DEFENSE 195 (1967).
14. California has been the forerunner in this area. In People v. Conley, 64 Cal.
2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966), the defendant was convicted of
first degree murder despite evidence of intoxication. Justice Traynor, speaking for the
court, held that it was error not to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.
He reasoned that the special mental state in murder is malice aforethought and that
evidence of intoxication is admissible to show that the defendant did not act with
malice. The California Appeals Court later extended the Conley holding to second
degree murder. In People v. Harris, 7 Cal. App. 3d 922, 87 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1970),
the court held that evidence of diminished capacity may be used to show that the
defendant did not have the malice aforethought necessary for second degree murder.
The significant aspect of California's diminished capacity doctrine is that it recognizes
malice aforethought as the distinct mental state which may be negated at the time of
the actus reus.
The Conley case in effect recognizes an additional type of manslaughter not in the
statutes. This type may be intentional, voluntary, deliberate, premeditated, and un-
provoked, but which differs from murder because the element of malice is rebutted
by a showing that the defendant's mental capacity was impaired by intoxication, 3
LOYOLA U. L. Radv. (L.A.) 153, 157 (1970). See also People v. Moles, 10 Cal. App. 3d
614, 89 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1970) (holding that diminished capacity reduces the crime of
murder to manslaughter) and cases cited in Annot., 22 A.L.R. 3d 1228, 1252-53
(1968).
It should be noted that in those jurisdictions which only have one degree of murder,
sufficient evidence of diminished capacity will reduce the murder charge to man-
slaughter. For a general discussion of diminished capacity, see Cooper, Diminished
Capacity, 4 LOYOLA U. L. REv. (L.A.) 308 (1971); Leib, Diminished Capacity: Its
Potential Effect in California, 3 LOYOLA U. L. REv. (L.A.) 153, 157 (1970); Note,
Punishment Rationale for Diminished Capacity, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 561 (1971).
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his mental faculties at the time of the actus reus. State v. Gooze in-
volved an automobile accident which resulted in the death of another
driver when the defendant was driving with knowledge that he was
subject to a sudden blackout at any time.15 The court found that he
had committed an act of "wantonness with a disregard for the rights
and safety of others" and affirmed his conviction. 16 Although the de-
fendant in Gooze was guilty of "culpable negligence", an important
aspect of the case is the court's focus on the defendant's knowledge of
his condition. In Edwards v. State the defendant, driving while intoxi-
cated, ran over a highway patrolman who was standing on the edge of
the highway.' 7  The court stated that it was "inconceivable" that a
person would drink without realizing he would eventually become in-
toxicated. Because he drank with the knowledge that he would later
drive home and that such conduct would be perilous to human life, the
court held it permissible for the jury to imply a "high degree of con-
scious and wilful recklessness" constituting malice.'" His conviction
for second degree murder was affirmed.
In the principal case Jewett's sole defense was insanity. Over objec-
tion by the defense, the jury was instructed on both voluntary intoxi-
cation and insanity. 19 Jewett argued that the voluntary intoxication
15. 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811 (1951).
16. Id.
17. 202 Tenn. 393, 304 S.W.2d 500 (1957).
18. Id. at 395, 304 S.W.2d at 503.
The general rule on epileptics is that they are not responsible for their actions when
they are experiencing the effects of seizure. See People v. Baksys, 26 A.D.2d 648,
272 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1966). However, if they know they have a history of epi-
lepsy and take the risk of driving a car, they are guilty of criminal negligence.
See People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799 (1956). If the epileptic has no
prior knowledge of his condition, he is acquitted. See People v. Freeman, 61 Cal.
App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 435 (1943).
But see Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 39 Am. R. 213 (1879). The court
held that Fain was not responsible for killing a man because he was unconscious at
the time of the crime and therefore had committed no voluntary act. Fain had knowl-
edge that he was a sleepwalker who often became violent when awakened, and, on
this occasion, he had gone to sleep in a hotel lobby with two pistols next to him.
19. The court gave the following instruction on voluntary intoxication:
If you find that the defendant was legally insane at the time the criminal act
he is charged with occurred, but you find beyond a reasonable doubt that
his mental disability was the result of his voluntarily drinking alcoholic bev-
erages, and if you further find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was aware
of the effects of his drinking alcoholic beverages, then the defendant's mental
disability does not relieve him of criminal responsibility.
438 F.2d at 497.
The jury was given M'Naughten instructions on insanity. M'Naughten has been
Washington University Open Scholarship
166 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
instruction was inappropriate because his consumption of alcohol was
simply one of several causal factors of his insanity. The court of ap-
peals emphasized the psychiatrist's affirmative answer to the question
"... is the alcohol a necessary and vital ingredient in order for the
defendant to become psychotic? '20  This fact, plus evidence that Jew-
ett could exercise a choice whether to drink and had knowledge of the
effect of alcohol on him, was sufficient forthe court to affirm the use
of the voluntary intoxication instruction.
Under this theory, the malice requirement of second degree murder
is implied from the defendant's voluntarily placing himself in a par-
ticular condition knowing that he might then become violent and
cause great bodily harm.2 Jewett's position is similar to the person
with recurring blackouts in Gooze and the intoxicated driver in Ed-
wards.22  There does not appear to be justification for treating the
three cases differently; but the person with recurring blackouts was
convicted of culpable negligence while the other two were convicted
of second degree murder. It has been suggested that "the character
and degree of risk distinguishes criminal from non-criminal negligence,
whereas awareness of the risk distinguishes murder from manslaugh-
ter."2 3  The same writers, however, concede that awareness of the risk
may be required for manslaughter as well as murder. 4 They conclude
that, because of the difficulty in determining degrees of risk, "the jury
may be expected in many cases to do no more than ask itself whether
the particular behavior should be punished. '2  This conclusion is sup-
ported by the three cases discussed because society is likely to attribute
less blame to the epileptic subject to blackouts than to the intoxicated
offender.
abandoned in most circuits because the test fails to include "those who to some extent
can differentiate between right and wrong, but lack the capacity to control their acts
to a substantial degree". Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U.
Cm. L. REv. 367 (1955). However, the issue over the validity of the M'Naughten
test is moot in this case, because there is little doubt that Jewett would have been
legally insane under any test.
20. 438 F.2d at 498. It should be noted that one who is described as mentally
ill by a psychiatrist will not be necessarily be found legally insane.
21. Deddens, Volitional Fault and the Intoxicated Criminal Offender, 36 U. CIN.
L. Rnv. 259, 262 (1967).
22. See notes 15 and 18 supra and accompanying text.
23. Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUm. L.
Rnv. 701, 721 (1937).
24. Id. at 722.
25. Id.
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By focusing on the defendant's voluntary intoxication, a court is
able to reach a result without considering the defendant's mental prob-
lems which fall short of legal insanity. Such a disposition may find
the defendant responsible for a more serious crime than his mental
state warrants. The advantage of the diminished capacity rule is that
it provides for greater flexibility in determining the degree of guilt and,
consequently, the sentence.2 6 Despite this advantage, the diminished
capacity rule would not have changed the result in the principal case
unless the Eighth Circuit also recognized malice aforethought as "a
special mental element" in second degree murder.27 The diminished
26. Professor Hall has attempted to justify the lack of intermediate areas between
legal sanity and insanity by stating that the principles of legality-the "rule of law'-
is a limitation on penalization by the state's officials, and this limitation may only be
effectuated by the prescription and application of specific rules:
The issue of the rule of law is involved in the criticism of the legal classifi-
cation of defendants as either "sane or insane." This "black or white" busi-
ness, say some psychiatrists, files in the face of the known facts--the inter-
mediate grays, the hardly perceptible differences forming an unbroken con-
tinum between the ideal extremes. But a legal order, unlike the specific
findings of unfettered experts, requires generalizations describing classes of
persons, conduct, harms, and sanctions. Given such a class, it follows inex-
orably that any "item," e.g., a mental condition, falls within the class or it
falls outside it, if only by a hair's breadth. The same holds equally for the
classes of data defined in any science or discipline, and the difficulties en-
countered by psychiatrists in reaching agreement on a sound classification of
the psychoses aptly illustrate the limitations that are inherent as well in legal
systems. These limitations, as regards legal classification, could not be met
by adding a class of the "partially responsible," for there would still be inter-
mediate between the three classes. And so it would continue, no matter how
many classes were provided.
J. HALL, GENERAL PINCIPLES OF CmMINAL LAw 461 (2d ed. 1960). He has stated,
however, that among those who are sane and legally responsible, there are degrees
of mental impairment which ought to be accounted for at least in the imposition of
sentence. Id. at 461-62.
27. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
The distinction between general and specific intent, which traditionally forms the
boundary lines for both the exculpatory and the diminished capacity rules, is subject
to criticism:
And whatever else may be said about intention, an essential characteristic of
it is that it is directed towards a definite end. To assert therefore that an
intention is "specific" is to employ a superfluous term just as if one were to
speak of a "voluntary act." It follows also that if some intentions are to be
distinguished from others, the criteria selected to do that must be coherent
with the specificity of all intentions. This provides one guide to a critical
reading and improvement of current professional discourse in terms of
"general intent" and "specific intent". Insofar as these terms are used to refer
to actual intentions, both of them are unfortunate, and the adjectives should
be discontinued.
J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 142 (2d ed. 1960).
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capacity rule has been criticized because under the rule the mentally
deficient, who may be potentially dangerous, is convicted of a lesser
crime and is thereby free after a relatively short term to prey again
upon society.28
The distinction between voluntary intoxication and insanity result-
ing from a long-continued overindulgence has been criticized because
more fault may be found in the "long-continued overindulgence than
in a single debauch" and both are the result of voluntary conduct by
the actor.29 Nevertheless, the distinction survives, and its survival may
be attributed to the ease with which mens rea can be found in the
single episode. The application of these rules to the principal case re-
flects a conflict between the theory and objectives of the criminal jus-
tice system and its practice. Perhaps cases such as Jewett should focus
more on a disposition which is consistent with these objectives. By
applying any of the rules available, Jewett's disposition would have
resulted in incarceration in a penal or correctional facility, and it is
this determination which should be questioned in light of the criminal
laws trend toward rehabilitation."
28. A. GOLDSTErN, TnE INsANrry DEFENSE 199-202 (2d ed. 1970). See also Note,
Defense of Insanity: Partial Responsibility: Adequacy of Present Law, 43 CoRNELL
L. REv. 283, 286 (1957):
In such a case (partial responsibility) the punishment prescribed by the Law
is inflicted, but the length of the term is greatly cut down. It is because of
this feature that there have occurred, and in fact occur every day, instances
of homicidal criminals and incendiaries, monomaniacs perhaps, but neverthe-
less extremely dangerous offenders, escaping with a sentence of a few years
prison.
Some writers have answered this concern with the proposal that confinement in a
mental institution should follow release from prison. See, e.g., Note, Volitional Fault
and the Criminally Intoxicated Offender, 36 U. G-N. L. REv. 258, 278 (1967). Justice
Marshall points out in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 528 (1968), however, that
our public mental institutions are not only terribly overcrowded, but, in many ways,
are not too different from prison. See note 30 infra.
29. R. PamniNs, CiUM NAL LAw 906 (2d ed. 1969).
30. It must be pointed out, however, that the placing of a mentally deficient of-
fender in a mental hospital may do little to solve the offender's problem; in fact, it is
likely that he will not fare very differently from the man who is sane and guilty:
. . . [H]e must weigh those advantages [of the insanity defense] against the
fact that his detention is for an entirely indeterminate period; that he may
be kept in a hospital as long as or longer than he would have remained in
prison; and that being regarded as mentally ill may bring him as much
stigma, economic deprivation, family dislocation, and often as little treatment
or physical comfort as being a criminal.
A. GoLDSmrEN, THE NSArry DEFENSE 20 (2d ed. 1970).
When alcoholism is involved, as in the principal case, there is the additional problem
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that "there is as yet no known generally effective method for treating the vast number
of alcoholics in our society". Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 527 (1967).
When one considers the above factors, the whole debate over "what is a proper dis-
position?" may be viewed as moot. If so, attention should be focused on the efficacy
of our correctional and rehabilitative institutions.
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